Tracking ship movements with social media

Use case

The intent of this exercise was three-fold:

  1. Can Russian naval vessel movements be detected/monitored using social media?
  2. Can chatter from Russian Naval personnel be found, particularly posts made onboard a vessel with location services enabled; and
  3. Can intelligence about the vessel’s capabilities, mission or crew be derived from OSINT.


Our tools were configured to detect mentions of Russian naval vessel names and the different classes of vessels, e.g. frigate, destroyer, submarine etc. This was done in both English and Russian languages. Filters were also set up to detect mentions of these entities in relation to areas of operation.

Figure 1 – Monitoring Russian Naval Forces with Providence

Finally, we added a Russian language filter to make it extremely easy to identify Russian language only posts.

The data collected, processed covers a time period spanning from December 1st 2012 through to November 3rd 2017. Most of the data was collected from September 1st to November 3rd 2017 due to the restrictions on historical data implemented by the various social media APIs that were used as data sources. The dashboard was set up to allow for extremely fast filtering of large sets of data which allowed the analyst to quickly identify and understand the information collected


Statistical Findings

During the time period spanning December 1st 2012 through to November 3rd 2017 the following statistics were noted:

  • Pacific, Mediterranean and Atlantic accounted for the top three locations mentioned in relation to Russian naval vessels
  • Navy, submarine and ship accounted for the top three vessel filters, with navy overwhelmingly taking the majority at 98.41% of detections.

Figure 2 – Location and vessel mentions last 5 years

Changing the timeframe to the past seven days shows that vessel mentions fall within the same statistical range, with the term navy making up the majority.

However, it shows a change in chatter in relation to location has greatly increased for the Pacific and Mediterranean.

Figure 3 – Location and vessel mentions last 7 days
  • This change was largely in relation to the following events:
  • Reports of Russia planning to build a Pacific naval base on a disputed Island chain near Japan;
  • Reports that INDRA 2017, a major Russia-India military exercise has finished; and
  • Russian military launching four ballistic missiles from submarines and a transporter erector launcher in a recent battle drill.

Statistical information such as this can be used as an indicator of naval activity.

Vessel movements

The main ways in which social media was used to determine Russian naval vessel movements and/or locations was through posts by social media users who had location services enabled when posting, allowing geolocation of the post and through crowd sourced information. The crowd sourced information was predominantly from naval, military or ship enthusiasts who track, photograph and post about the subject. Much in the same way train spotters or plane spotters operate.

These are normally locals who live in or around a given area of operation or a base.

Another source to draw from are news and media outlets who report movements as news stories.

Three posts were identified in relation to the Russian navy.

One post in relation to the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, which is an aircraft carrier serving as the flagship to the Russian navy, was geolocated to Murmansk, not far from the ships home port of Severomorsk.

Figure 4 – Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov

The post is a Facebook “check-in” by a Facebook user checking in using the ship’s name.

Figure 5 – Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov geolocation

Additionally, two posts were geo-located in an area where the Baltic fleet operates from in the towns of Kem and Belomorsk. These posts were Facebook “check-in’s” at these locations. Initial analysis could not determine whether the poster was part of the Russian naval forces.

Figure 6 – Posts geo-located near Baltic fleet operations

Widening the time frame of the data, we found another geo-located post. Here, the Russian cruiser Varyag was photographed by a local pulling into port in Vladivostok in 2015.

Figure 7 – Varyag photographed moored in Vladivostok port

The user posting this appears to be a local and falls into the crowd sources/enthusiast category. The user posted a series of six photographs of the Varyag in port from a variety of locations and distances.

Figure 8 – Varyag geolocation

Another example was the Guided Missile Frigate Admiral Grigorovich being photographed in Sevastopol, Crimea by a user during navy day celebrations.

Weapons systems

In the same way that location information can be derived from open sources, information relating to capabilities can be collected. An example of this is photographs that may be of interest in relation to weapons systems.

Some social media users may have access to vessels one otherwise wouldn’t or are afforded a prime opportunity to take photographs due to the location they are in.

One such user was identified taking close up photographs of the Admiral Essen during its commissioning in June 2016.

Figure 9 – Admiral Essen photographed during commissioning

Again, this user took a series of photographs of the Admiral Essen from different vantage points. Included in the series of photographs aside from the ship were some close-up images of Russian aircraft that were there for the celebrations during commissioning of the ship.

Figure 10 – Tupolev Tu-22M


It is possible to use OSINT and social media to detect and monitor the location and movements of Russian naval forces and identify their capabilities. Furthermore, this capability can be used to conduct similar operations on any military force as the behaviour associated with the posters of this information is not restricted to Russian social media users.

It should be noted that this is but one tool in an intelligence arsenal and information found would be used in conjunction with intelligence gained from other sources such as satellite imagery and HUMINT reporting.

Another aspect that was not explored in this report is the identification of credible sources in social media. Once a user is found that is a source of good information social media can be used to monitor their postings and collect information of importance to an analyst.